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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an unemployment benefits case. Appellant Ameritel Inns, Inc. 
("Ameritel") appeals from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission 
("Commission") that concluded Respondent Megan D. Keller ("Keller") was 
eligible for unemployment benefits. Ameritel asks this Court to overturn the 
Commission's factual findings that: (a) Keller was discharged by Ameritel; and 
(b) Ameritel failed to meet its burden of proving that Keller was discharged for 
misconduct in connection employment. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On or about June 14, 2017, Keller applied for unemployment benefits 
with the Idaho Department of Labor ("Department") following her separation 
from employment with Ameritel. Exhibit, p.3. 
On July 5, 2017, the Department issued a personal eligibility 
determination that found Keller was not eligible for unemployment benefits. 
Exhibit, pp.16-17. 
Keller timely filed an appeal from the eligibility determination on July 
19, 2017. Exhibit, pp.22-23. 
On August 8, 2017, a telephonic hearing was held on Keller's appeal 
before an Appeals Examiner with the Department. R., p.1. 
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On August 10, 2017, the Appeals Examiner issued a written decision 
which found that Keller was eligible for benefits because Ameritel discharged 
her, but not for employment-related misconduct. R., p.6. 
Ameritel timely appealed from the decision of the Appeals Examiner to 
the Commission by filing a notice of appeal on August 18, 2017. R., pp.9-11. 
The Department entered its notice of appearance. R., pp. 16-17. 
The Commission conducted a de novo review of the record, R., p.46, and 
on October 2, 2017, entered its decision finding Keller was eligible for benefits 
because she had been discharged by Ameritel, and Ameritel failed to meet its 
burden of proving her discharge was for misconduct in connection with 
employment. R., pp.45-55. 
On November 7, 2017, Keller timely appealed from the Commission's 
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. R., p.57-59. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
Keller began working as a housekeeper at Ameritel on April 9, 2016. Tr., 
p.14, 11.6-14. She later became pregnant and had a due date of mid-September 
2017. Tr., p.67, 11.20-22. 
Keller was at all times a good worker. She was never disciplined or 
reprimanded by her employer. Tr., p.65, 11.20-24, p.66, 11.1-3. Her supervisor 
conceded there were no disciplinary notes in her personnel file. Tr., p.63, 11.4-8. 
During the latter months of her pregnancy, Keller was absent from work 
due to complications from her pregnancy, namely, that she "was in and out of 
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the hospital a few times and [she was having] a lot of nausea ... and throwing 
up all the time." Tr., p.69, 11.4-8. The chemicals at work were contributing to 
Keller's complications to the point that she "would have to wear a mask, and 
even that [didn't] work, it made [her] even more sick." Tr., p.71, 11.12-19. In 
May of 2017, Keller's "illnesses started getting worse." Tr., p.70, 11.3-10. 
Keller's supervisor, Cody Black, said he would start looking into 
arranging her work to address these difficulties. Tr., p.75, 11.2-4. Keller also 
was asked if she wanted to reduce her schedule. Tr., p.75, 11.7-14. 
On June 2, 2017, Black called Keller to discuss what could be done for 
her: 
I called her and asked her what she wanted to do, if she would like 
to be taken off the schedule and go on leave, if she wanted less days, 
and she agreed that we could figure out some sort of leave 
situation, like medical leave the next time she came into work. 
Tr., p.43, 11.20-25. 
Ameritel's general manager, Gary Horton, testified that on June 2nd, 
Keller "called out sick after her shift had started" and texted Black to inform 
him of that fact and let him know "that she still wasn't feeling good and that 
most likely she might not be in on the 3rd, but wasn't sure." Tr., p.19, 11.13-18. 
Horton testified that Keller sent a text message to Black five minutes before her 
shift on June 3rd "stating that she would come in and speak with him about a 
discussion of possibly some leave or modification of employment, provided she 
was continually sick." Tr., p.20, 11.9-13. Horton conceded that Black "may have 
been able to take that as her calling in and letting him know that she wasn't 
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going to be available for her work on the 3rd by that statement." Tr., p .20, 11.14-
16. Black, in his testimony, stated that Keller texted him on June 3rd "saying 
she wasn't coming to work." Tr. , p.47, 11.13-14. 
Keller did not show up for work June 4, 2017, and, according to Ameritel, 
it received no notice from Keller that she would be absent. Tr., p.20, 1.19. Keller 
testified that she thought she had sent a text message to Black on June 4th to 
inform him that she would be out sick, but that the text message may not have 
transmitted due to "user error" or some other reason. Tr. , p.74, 11.2-11. 
The next day, June 5, 2017, Keller texted Black that she would be coming 
in to "discuss her sick leave" with him. Tr., p.48, 11.12-16. When Black received 
this text from Keller, he immediately contacted his general manager, Gary 
Horton, for instructions on how to respond her text. Black testified that his 
manager "just told me to text her that since she no call, no showed that she 
broke policy and that she was done." Tr. , p.48, 11.17-21 (emphasis added). Black 
testified further that he then communicated to Keller "that with her no call, no 
showing on Sunday that she was no longer employed with us and that I was just 
going to take her off the schedule." Tr., p.49, 11.13-15 (emphasis added). 
Keller testified that she did not quit her job, but, rather, was discharged 
by Ameritel. Tr., p.64, 11.11-17. 
As discussed infra, despite the fact that Keller's policies regarding 
employee attendance were unclear and loosely applied, particularly as to Keller, 
Ameritel chose to treat Keller's "no call, no show" as a job abandonment and 
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voluntary quit. Tr., p.20, 1.25 - p.21, 1.2. 
This was the first time during Keller's employment with Ameritel that 
she was a "no call, no show." Tr., p.67, 1.23 - p.68, 1.5. 
After Keller filed for unemployment benefits, Ameritel contested her 
eligibility and has continued to assert that Keller quit her job. 
Ameritel appeals from the Commission's decision that found Keller 
eligible for unemployment benefits. R., p.57-59. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Does substantial competent evidence support the Commission's 
findings that Keller was discharged by Ameritel, and that Ameritel 
failed to prove it discharged Keller for misconduct in connection 
with employment? 
II. Should the Department be awarded its reasonable attorney fees 
and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) and I.A.R. 41? 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 




Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's 
Findings that Keller Was Discharged By Ameritel, and that Ameritel Failed to 
Prove Keller Was Discharged for Misconduct in Connection with Employment 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court's jurisdiction in appeals from decisions of the Commission is 
confined by the Idaho Constitution "to questions oflaw." Idaho Const., Art. V, § 
9. Accordingly, the Court is "constitutionally compelled" to uphold Commission 
findings of fact supported by substantial competent evidence. Locker v. How 
Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 699, 263 P.3d 750, 753 (2011); Folks v. Moscow School 
District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997). See also, I.C. § 
72-732(1) (Commission findings must be upheld unless they "are not based on 
any substantial competent evidence"). 
Substantial competent evidence 1s "such relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Folks, 129 
Idaho at 836, 933 P.2d at 645. When applying this standard on appeal, all facts 
and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the facts found by the 
Commission, and the Commission's determinations as to credibility of witnesses 
and weight of evidence must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Bell v. Idaho 
Dept. of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 746-747, 339 P.3d 1148, 1150-1151 (2014). This 
Court will not "re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached 
a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Bell, 157 Idaho at 747, 339 
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P.3d at 1151, quoting Hughen v. Highland Estates. 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 
1238, 1240 (2002). 
B. Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's Finding 
That Keller Was Discharged By Ameritel 
An unemployment compensation claimant bears the burden of proving 
statutory eligibility for benefits. Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 
417, 614 P.2d 955, 957 (1980). 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is not eligible for 
benefits if the claimant "left his employment voluntarily without good cause 
connected with his employment" or "was discharged for misconduct in 
connection with his employment." Under Section 72-1366(5), 
[t]he first step in proving eligibility ... is establishing whether an 
employee quit or was discharged. The second step in proving 
eligibility depends upon the outcome of the first step. If the 
employee quit, the second step is establishing whether it was with 
good cause. If the employee was discharged, the second step is 
establishing whether it was for misconduct. 
Johnson v. Idaho Cent. Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867, 869, 908 P.2d 560, 562 
(1995). Once a claimant proves that he or she was discharged, the burden shifts 
to the employer to prove the claimant was discharged for misconduct in 
connection with employment. Id. Accord, IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01 ("The burden 
of proving that a claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct 
rests with the employer."). 
An employee is discharged when an "employer's actions or statements 
could reasonably be interpreted as discharging the claimant." Hart v. Deary 
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High School, 126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1994); accord, Johnson 
v. Idaho Central Credit Union, supra (test is whether words or actions of 
employer would logically lead prudent person to believe he or she had been 
terminated by employer). Viewed from the opposite perspective of a "voluntary 
quit," as a general rule there must be an intent on the part of the employee to 
leave employment and "absence from the job is not a [voluntary quit] where the 
worker intends merely a temporary interruption in the employment 
relationship." Taylor v. Burley Care Center, 121 Idaho 792, 796, 828 P.2d 821, 
825 (1991), quoting, Totorica v. Western Equipment Co., 88 Idaho 534, 542, 401 
P.2d 817 (1965). Further, whether an employee quit or was discharged is 
question of fact. Johnson v. Idaho Central Credit Union, supra. 
In the case at bar, after carefully reviewing the evidence, the Commission 
found that Keller did not quit her job but, rather, was discharged by Ameritel: 
Although Employer treated Claimant's failure to report to work on 
June 4, 2017 without informing her supervisor of her absence as 
job abandonment, the evidence in this case establishes that 
Employer discharged Claimant. Claimant did not quit. 
Decision and Order, p.4 (emphasis added). Substantial competent evidence 
supports this finding. 
It is undisputed that Keller was absent from work on June 3, 2017, and 
that she informed her immediate supervisor, Cody Black, by text message that 
she would not be coming to work that day. Tr., p.47, 11.13-14 (testimony of Cody 
Black). 
Keller also did not appear for work on June 4, 2017. The Commission 
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found that she had prepared a text message to inform Cody Black of this fact, 
"but for whatever reason, the message never transmitted." Decision and Order, 
p.3, ,r 9. This finding is supported by the testimony of Keller: 
Q. . .. Megan, why did you no show, no call on the 4th? 
Why did you not come in that day? 
A. I honestly had - - I honestly had written out the text 
message and I had thought that I had sent it. So, I don't know if it 
was - - I was sick, obviously. That's the only reason why I wouldn't 
have came in, but - - yeah. So, I don't know if it was a user error 
as in I didn't send it, because I was so sick and I didn't - - I thought 
I had and I didn't or if it was a technical fault. 
Tr., p.74, 11.2-11. 
The fact that Keller neither quit nor intended to quit when she did not 
show up for work on June 4, 2017, is supported by her testimony: 
Q. Ma'am, were you discharged or did you quit your job? 
A. Discharged. 
Tr., p.64, 11.11-13. 
The finding that Keller did not quit is further supported by her conduct 
on the day after her June 4th absence from work. It is undisputed that on June 
5, 2017, Keller texted her supervisor to inform him that she would be coming in 
to "discuss her sick leave" with him, which is what the parties had planned to 
do on June 3, 2017. Tr., p.48, 11.12-16. From this fact alone, a reasonable mind 
could conclude that Keller had no intention of quitting when she missed work 
on June 4th. Keller never informed her employer that she had, or was planning 
to, quit her job. To the contrary, the very next day after Keller's so-called job 
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abandonment she texted her supervisor to make arrangements to come in and 
discuss her sick leave. If there no longer was an employer-employee 
relationship, then any discussion of sick leave would have been a moot point. 
What does make sense and what, frankly, is the only reasonable 
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, is that Ameritel terminated Keller. 
The Commission's finding that Ameritel did just that follows directly from the 
testimony of supervisor Black. When Keller texted Black on June 5th about 
coming in to discuss sick leave, Black immediately contacted his general 
manager for instructions on how to respond to her text. Black testified that his 
general manager "just told me to text her that since she no call, no showed that 
she broke policy and that she was done." Tr., p.48, 11.17-21 (emphasis added). 
Black testified further that he then communicated to Keller "that with her no 
call, no showing on Sunday that she was no longer employed with us and that I 
was just going to take her off the schedule." Tr., p.49, 11.13-15 (emphasis added). 
Under the facts of this case, a statement such as this, made by a 
supervisor to his subordinate, that "you are no longer employed with us," Tr., 
p.49, 11.13-15, is undeniably a statement that "could reasonably be interpreted 
as discharging the [employee]." Hart v. Deary High School, 126 Idaho 550, 552, 
887 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1994). 
Keller testified to her surprise at this abrupt termination: 
Q. . . . Were you surprised when they said you 
voluntarily quit due to no call, no show? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And why were you surprised? 
A. Because I wasn't really expecting that. It was my first 
time ever no call, no showing or having portrayed any kind of that 
- any kind of behavior at work. 
Tr., p.67, 1.23 - p.68, 1.5. 
Keller's surprise was understandable for the additional reason that she 
and her employer were in the early stages of discussions to try to find an 
accommodation or other workplace solution for the complications she was 
experiencing due to her pregnancy, and on June 2nd they had agreed to discuss 
those issues. 
One would have to disbelieve the testimony of both Keller and Black to 
conclude that Keller was not discharged. Ameritel's "no call," no show voluntary 
quit argument is, at best, a red herring in the truest sense of that expression, 
and, at worst, a patent sophism. 
Substantial competent evidence supports the Commission finding that 
Ameritel discharged Keller. Under the deferential standard of review 
constitutionally compelled in these cases, that finding must be upheld. Locker 
v. How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho at 699, 263 P.3d at 753. 
C. Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's Finding 
That Ameritel Failed to Prove It Discharged Keller For Misconduct In 
Connection With Employment 
Because Keller was discharged from her employment, the burden of proof 
shifted to Ameritel to establish that it discharged her for misconduct in 
connection with employment. Johnson v. Idaho Cent. Credit Union, 127 Idaho 
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at 869, 908 P.2d at 562; IDAPA 09.01.30 .. 275.01 Whether an employee's 
behavior constitutes misconduct in connection with employment is a question of 
fact and reviewed on appeal for substantial competent evidence. Adams v. 
Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 413, 247 P.3d 635, 640 (2011). 
"Misconduct" in unemployment benefits cases turns not on whether the 
employer had reasonable grounds for discharge, but rather on whether the facts 
resulting in the discharge constitute misconduct under Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) 
and IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. See Adams, supra, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 
640. The salient flaw of Ameritel's arguments on appeal is its failure to grasp 
this important distinction. 
The Department's administrative rules describe the proof needed for an 
employer to meet its burden of establishing "misconduct" in this setting: 
02. Disqualifying Misconduct. Misconduct that disqualifies a 
claimant for benefits must be connected with the claimant's 
employment and involve one of the following: 
a. Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful, intentional 
disregard of the employer's interest. 
h. Violation of Reasonable Rules. A deliberate violation of 
the employer's reasonable rules. 
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged 
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior 
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, 
there is no requirement that the claimant's conduct be 
willful, intentional, or deliberate. The claimant's subjective 
state of mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct in 
"standard of behavior cases" is as follows: 
1. Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the standard 
of behavior expected by the employer; and 
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ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively 
reasonable in the particular case. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. This three-pronged approach follows well-established 
Idaho case law. E.g., Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 
217, 219 (1957); Jenkins v. Agri-Lines Corp., 11 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979); 
Folks, supra, 129 Idaho at 836-837, 933 P.2d at 645-646. 
The Commission considered all three potential factual bases for 
misconduct - violation of employer's reasonable rules, disregard of standards of 
behavior, and disregard of employer's interest - and found that Ameritel failed 
to demonstrate misconduct under any of them. These factual findings of the 
Commission are supported by substantial competent evidence and should be 
upheld. 
1. Ameritel failed to prove misconduct based upon a deliberate 
violation of its reasonable rules 
In evaluating the evidence under the "rules" prong of misconduct, the 
Commission correctly looked first to Ameritel's written rules, and observed: 
Employer's policy requires employee communication with 
supervisors. Employer's policy states that "Whenever an employee 
intends to be absent from work (whether for one shift or for a longer 
period of time), or is going to be late, he or she must provide notice 
to the property manager. Employees are expected to contact their 
property manager or other designated point-of-contact as soon as 
possible so that a replacement may be brought in for your [sic] 
shift." (Exhibit C: p.4.) 
Although Employer contends that Claimant's absences were 
"excessive," the policy does not define "excessive absences." 
Decision and Order, pp.4-5. Ameritel's policy did not describe the means by 
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which an employee must use to make contact. Id., p.5. The Commission 
concluded: 
Id. 
The evidence in the record establishes that Claimant and 
Black established a practice of using text messages. Employer's 
policy is too vague to put Claimant on notice that her attendance 
was unacceptable and put her job in jeopardy. Employer's 
witnesses agree that no one specifically told Claimant that her 
attendance was violating Employer's policy. Consequently, 
Employer cannot establish that Claimant deliberately violated an 
established rule or even the "spirit" of the rule. 
Substantial competent evidence supports these findings. First, one of 
Ameritel's witnesses, general manager Gary Horton, testified that what was 
"adequate notice" under employer's attendance policy was "subjective" and that 
the policy itself did not specifically state what notice was "adequate." Tr., p.23, 
11.4-7. Horton testified that Ameritel did not begin to feel that Keller's absences 
were excessive until the end of May 2017, and that because of her work absences 
due to illness from that point forward, Ameritel never had a discussion with 
Keller to let her know that her absences had become excessive and no longer 
would be tolerated: 
Q. . .. [E]xplain to me at what point here did the 
employer feel that claimant's attendance was - that her absences 
were excessive? 
A. The -we were feeling that it was excessive, but trying 
to give her the benefit of the doubt, understanding her condition 
and what she was going through. 
Q. At what point? 
A. Let's call it end of- end of May. 
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Q. End of May? Was there some sort of discussion with 
claimant? 
A. There had not been a discussion with the claimant, 
because she never showed up for work. 
Q. Well, no-
A. She kept calling in sick by the time we decided what 
we wanted to -
Tr., p. 26, 11.1-15. Ameritel conceded that, if Keller's inconsistent attendance 
has gotten out of hand, it "absolutely" was Ameritel's fault for not enforcing its 
claimed attendance policy earlier on. Tr., p.31, 11.13-16 (testimony of Gary 
Horton). 
The Commission's finding regarding the absence of a specific company 
rule or policy governing the manner in which an employee should communicate 
an absence finds direct support, again, from Ameritel's own witness. Kristi 
Bachman, Ameritel's human resources manager, testified: 
Our company does not say in [its policy] that you cannot text, it 
just asks to provide sufficient notice. Each property sets their own 
policies as to whether or not they well accept text messages as 
notice. 
Tr., p.61, 11.6-9. 
Last, and most important, to establish misconduct under the rules prong, 
an employer must prove that the violation of the employer's reasonable rules 
was "deliberate." IDAPA 09.0l.30.275.02(b). Ameritel argues on appeal that 
the rules violation of significance in this case is the failure of Keller to timely 
communicate her June 4th absence to her supervisor. However, the unrebutted 
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testimony of Keller, quoted supra at pp.9-10 of this brief, is that she attempted 
to send a text message to Black on June 4th to inform him that she would be out 
sick, but that for some unknown reason it did not transmit. See Tr., p.74, 11.2-
11. This testimony supports a finding that Keller's apparent failure to 
communicate her June 4th absence to Black was not deliberate; she tried to do 
so but, unbeknownst to her, the communication failed. 
The finding that Ameritel failed to establish misconduct with proof of a 
deliberate violation of its reasonable rules is supported by substantial 
competent evidence and must be upheld. 
2. Ameritel failed to prove misconduct based upon a disregard of a 
standard of employee behavior that it had a right to expect of its employees 
The "standards of behavior" basis for establishing misconduct is set forth 
in the Department's administrative rules: 
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged 
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior 
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, 
there is no requirement that the claimant's conduct be 
willful, intentional, or deliberate. The claimant's subjective 
state of mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct in 
"standard of behavior cases" is as follows: 
1. Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the standard 
of behavior expected by the employer; and 
ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively 
reasonable in the particular case. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02(c). This Court explained in Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 
150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640, that "[t]he first prong of the [standards of 
behavior] test addresses only what the employer subjectively expected from the 
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employee." Under the second prong of this test, to be "objectively reasonable," 
an employer's expectation . . . must be communicated to the 
employee, unless the expectation is the type that flows naturally 
from the employment relationship. An expectation flows naturally 
from the employment relationship when the expectations are 
common among employees in general or within a particular 
enterprise. Such expectations are generally limited to 
fundamental expectations and do not involve specific rules unless 
clearly embodied in the job at issue. 
Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640 (citations omitted). 
Here, Ameritel's ambiguous policy concerning what is "adequate notice" 
of an employee's absence from work, see supra, brief at pp.14-16, supports a 
finding that Ameritel's expectations were not communicated to Keller. Further, 
because of Ameritel's course of conduct with Keller, particularly the "leniency" 
that Black afforded her regarding attendance, "in this particular enterprise" the 
strict attendance expectation now being asserted on appeal by Ameritel did not 
"naturally flow" from the employment relationship that existed between 
Ameritel and Keller. In a more typical employment context, this expectation 
might be expected to "naturally flow" from the employment relationship, but the 
relationship here was not typical. 
Manager Gary Horton testified that Keller's attendance was "very spotty 
and unreliable." Tr., p.16, 1.8. He explained that 
[l]ots of times [Keller called in] even after her shift had started, 
five , ten minutes following the start of her shift, maybe even 
shortly prior to her shift letting us know that she wouldn't be able 
to come in, that she was feeling sick over again. A couple of times 
when we would notify her that she would need to bring a doctor's 
note and she would call us the next day saying she was going to be 
a little bit late, because she still had to run by a clinic to pick up a 
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doctor's note to excuse her previous absence .... 
Tr., p.16, 11.8-17. 
The attendance expectation that flowed from the particular relationship 
between Ameritel and Keller was, in a word, lenient. Horton testified: 
A. . . . I believe we were trying to - we were making an 
attempt to be as accommodating as possible. 
Q. What would you do to - what would occur to any other 
employee that no called or no showed to a shift -- a scheduled shift? 
A. You know, typically we would - it depends on - on the 
individual and the history the individual had with us. If - if they 
had just been hired and they didn't call in for a shift, we would just 
assume that they didn't want their employ and - and terminate -
and consider them a no show, no call, and a voluntary quit. There 
are times that - like we did with Ms. Keller, reach out to her and 
try to contact them following the shift, giving them the benefit of 
the doubt that maybe they had not seen the schedule properly or 
not been on there and maybe reached out to them. 
Tr., p.18, 11.8-24. Ameritel never suggested to Keller that her absences from 
work had become unacceptable: 
EXAMINER LITTLE: ... And what I'm hearing from 
testimony is that the employer and claimant both discussed some 
sort of accommodations for her at work. However, at no time did 
the employer indicate to the claimant that her absences - her 
absences from work was [sic] unacceptable. Is that correct, Mr. 
Horton? 
MR. HORTON: I suppose so, Your Honor. 
Tr., p.83, 1.21 - p.84, 1.2. 
It bears emphasis that, under the teachings of this Court, "[a]n 
expectation flows naturally from the employment relationship when the 
expectations are common among employees in general or within a particular 
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enterprise." Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P .3d at 640 (emphasis added). At 
Ameritel - which is the "particular enterprise" involved here - its claimed 
expectation that no failures to appear for a scheduled shift would be tolerated, 
is not an expectation that flowed naturally from the relationship that existed 
between Keller and Ameritel. The parties' course of conduct demonstrates that 
the expectation was much less rigorous. 
Substantial competent evidence supports the Commission's finding that 
Ameritel failed to demonstrate misconduct under the "standards of behavior" 
test. 
3. Ameritel failed to prove misconduct based upon a willful, 
intentional disregard of its interest 
As noted above, an employer can prove misconduct by 
demonstrating a claimant willfully and intentionally disregarded an 
employer's interest. IDAPA 09.0l.30.275.02(a). The Commission found that 
Ameritel also failed to prove misconduct under this standard: 
In this case, Claimant maintains that she did the best that she 
could to keep in touch with her supervisor. She cannot explain why 
the text message she drafted on June 4, 2017 was never sent, but 
the failure was not intentional. (Audio Recording.) There is no 
evidence that Claimant's failures to meet Employer's standards 
were the result of some willful or intentional behavior. Therefore, 
it is concluded that Claimant acted without a "willful, intentional 
disregard" of Employer's interest. 
Decision and Order, p.9. 
The evidence discussed above under the "employer's rules" and 
"standards of behavior" prongs of misconduct supports this finding and need not 
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be reiterated here, except to say that Keller attempted to send a text message 
to Black that she would be out sick on June 4th but that for some unknown 
reason it did not transmit. See Tr., p.74, 11.2-11. Keller's apparent failure to 
communicate her June 4th absence to Black was neither deliberate nor willful 
and intentional. 
Substantial competent evidence supports the Commission's finding that 
Ameritel failed to prove that Keller willfully and intentionally disregarded its 
interest. The finding must be upheld. 
II. 
Attorney Fees and Costs Should Be Awarded to the Department Under 
LC.§ 12-117(1) and I.A.R. 41 Because Ameritel's Appeal Has No Reasonable 
Basis in Law or Fact 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (1) provides as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a 
person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing 
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable 
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The 2012 amendments to Idaho Code § 12-117(1) make clear that, if certain 
findings are made, attorney fees shall be awarded in appeals from decisions of 
the Commission. See 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws ch.149, p.419 (amending language 
of LC.§ 12-117 to enlarge its scope to include "any proceeding" and to direct an 
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party by the court "hearing the 
proceeding, including on appeal"). 
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Section 12-117(1) provides that the court "shall award the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees ... if it finds that the non prevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in law or fact." (Emphasis added.) See also Rule Steel 
Tanks, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 115 Idaho 812, 819, 317 P.2d 709, 716 (2013) 
(awarding attorney fees to Department in employer's appeal regarding transfer 
of experience rating account). 
As in Locker, supra, in this appeal, Ameritel simply asks this Court to 
engage in its own fact finding, and to reach a conclusion different from that of 
the Commission. This the Court cannot do. E.g., Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9. 
Ameritel has presented on appeal no legal issues of any significance. This is 
simply an appeal where Ameritel disagrees with the Commission's factual 
findings. Because this appeal was brought frivolously, and without a reasonable 
foundation in both law and fact, it is respectfully requested that the Department 
be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) 
and I.A.R. 41. 
CONCLUSION 
It is for the Commission to determine the credibility and weight to be 
accorded testimony; its findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
Locker, supra, 151 Idaho at 699, 263 P.3d at 753. Substantial competent 
evidence supports the Commission's findings that Ameritel discharged Keller, 
and that Ameritel failed to prove that she was discharged for misconduct in 
connection with employment. The Commission's decision must be affirmed. 
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Further, pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) and I.A.R. 41, because Ameritel's 
appeal has been brought without a reasonable foundation in fact or law, the 
Department as the prevailing party shall be awarded its reasonable attorney 
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